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It is proposed that certain features of quantum me-chanics may be perspectival effects, which arisebecause experiments performed on locally acces-
sible variables can only uncover a certain subset of
the correlations exhibited by an underlying determin-
istic theory. This hypothesis is used to derive the no-
signaling principle, thus resolving an open question
regarding the apparently fine-tuned nature of quan-
tum correlations. Some potential objections to this
approach are then discussed and answered.
Quanta 2018; 7: 40–53.
1 Introduction
As scientists we usually aim to formulate laws which pre-
dict facts about the future from facts about the present,
and this goal places strong constraints on the type of laws
which we typically propose. But we should be wary of
allowing ourselves to slip into a subtle and pervasive ver-
sion of the anthropomorphic fallacy: as Ken Wharton [1]
puts it, “There’s one last anthropocentric attitude that
needs to go, the idea that the computations we perform
are the same computations performed by the universe.”
Adherents of any reasonably strong form of scientific
realism will surely agree that it is meaningful to distin-
guish between the laws that scientists write down and the
true underlying laws of nature, and it would be naive to
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suppose that the two exactly coincide. For example, we
know from quantum mechanics that the laws of nature
may be spatially nonlocal [2, § 12], and special relativity
indicates that if the laws of nature are spatially nonlocal
then they are likely to also be temporally nonlocal, [3],
and together these two forms of nonlocality open up a
large range of possibilities for fundamental laws which
go beyond our standard paradigms for theory-building.
For example, our current scientific laws take as their argu-
ments variables which can be accessed and manipulated
by local observers such as ourselves, but if the true laws
of nature are spatially and/or temporally nonlocal then
they might also invoke global variables which are defined
with respect to the whole history of the universe, and
this possibility casts new light on a number of old scien-
tific questions. In particular, it is common to regard the
issue of determinism as a dichotomic dilemma: the uni-
verse must either be deterministic, meaning that the laws
of nature together with a specification of the conditions
on a single hyperplane of simultaneity suffice to fix all
conditions to the future of that hyperplane, or fundamen-
tally probabilistic, meaning that there exist facts about the
world which are not fixed by the laws of nature together
with initial conditions [4, 5]. But if the laws of nature do
in fact take global variables as their arguments, then we
have a third option: the universe could be deterministic in
a generalized sense when the global variables are taken
into account, whilst appearing probabilistic to agents such
as ourselves who do not have access to the whole picture.
This is not purely a matter of foundational interest: a
more mature understanding of the true form of the laws
of nature is likely to help guide the development of a new
generation of theories, and thus moving away from the
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paradigm of purely predictive laws might actually lead to
new experimental predictions. But of course, according
to the hypothesis proposed, observers such as ourselves
cannot directly measure global variables, so it is not im-
mediately obvious how to go about narrowing down the
range of possibilities for global laws. The approach I will
pursue here involves determining how various features
of global laws might be expected to constrain the local
behaviour that we observe. In particular, I will consider
the hypothesis that the global laws are deterministic in
an appropriately generalised sense, and I will show that
this idea is capable of providing a simple, physically re-
alistic explanation for the fine-tuned nature of quantum
no-signaling. This suggests that quantum no-signaling
may be described as a perspectival effect, which is not
to say that it is not real, but simply that it does not hold
universally—it is true only of the variables which happen
to be accessible to observers such as ourselves.
The basic components of this approach are set out in
section 2, and a short outline of the argument is presented
in section 3. The argument is developed in greater detail
in section 4; section 5 deals with some conceptual objec-
tions and section 6 discusses the underlying assumptions.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The fine-tuning problem for
no-signaling
For much of the history of physics it has been taken for
granted that causal influences are necessarily local in
space and time. Quantum physics, however, has chal-
lenged that assumption. Experimentally verified viola-
tions of Bell’s theorem demonstrate that, ignoring loop-
holes, the universe must contain correlations which are
in a specific technical sense nonlocal in space [6]. As a
result, physicsts have begun to take seriously the possi-
bility that the universe contains spatially nonlocal causal
influences—a choice of measurement direction for a mea-
surement at one spacetime point can have a direct causal
effect on the outcome of a measurement performed at
some spacelike separated point.
Yet we also know none of the nonlocal correlations
which can be produced within quantum physics can be
used to send signals: we cannot, by choosing a measure-
ment direction at one spacetime point, influence the prob-
ability distribution over the outcomes of a measurement
performed at some spacelike separated point. It is not
uncommon to feel that there is something uncomfortably
conspiratorial about this state of affairs [7], and indeed,
this intuition can be made formal: Wood and Spekkens
have shown that any causal model for nonsignaling cor-
relations which violate a Bell inequality must involve
fine-tuning of the causal parameters, [8] i.e. given any
such model, the conditional independences between vari-
ables exhibited by the probability distribution induced by
the model will not remain the same when the values of
the parameters of the model are varied.
It is a standard methodological principle of theoretical
physics that where we see fine-tuning we should seek an
explanation for it [9, 10], and thus there is a clear imper-
ative for us to provide an explanation for the fact that
all quantum correlations obey the no-signaling principle.
Simply postulating a global prohibition on signaling is not
sufficient, because signaling is an agent-relative concept
and thus such a prohibition would seem uncomfortably
close to making an in-principle distinction between agent
and world, which is distasteful from the point of view of
realism about science. Likewise it is preferable to avoid
resorting to claims that physics is in some sense about
information, which frequently give rise to fallacies [11].
In this article, I consider carefully the distinction between
no-signaling in the quantum and relativistic contexts and
propose a unifying definition which I believe to capture
the important content of both versions of no-signaling,
then propose an alternative, physically realistic explana-
tion for this property, thus suggesting a resolution to the
fine-tuning problem.
2.2 The process framework
I will make the simplifying assumption that the world is
composed of a large set of pointlike events, which consist
simply of a particular variable taking a particular value
at a particular spacetime point. I will suppose that the
laws of nature govern the relations between these events
directly, thus dispensing with the concept of state.
This simple picture of the world does not distinguish
between different types of variables, but in order to pro-
ceed further it is necessary to make a distinction between
input variables, whose values can be freely chosen by
local agents, and output variables, whose values are not
fully controllable by local agents. For example, in a
measurement of particle spin, the choice of measurement
direction is an input variable, and the measurement out-
come is an output variable. It is important to keep in mind
that this distinction depends crucially on the notion of
agency and on the specific physical manifestation of the
relevant class of agents, since different types of agents
with different physical capabilities might well pick out a
different set of input variables, and hence most of our defi-
nitions and commentary from here on in will be implicitly
relativized to a class of agents. Indeed, under the hypoth-
esis put forward in this article, the distinction between
input and output variables is entirely perspectival: there
is no difference between these variables from the point
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of view of the universe, only from the point of view of
agents who are able to set the values of some variables but
not others. However, one could imagine theories in which
this is not the case. For example, in a collapse model
of quantum mechanics, the results of quantum measure-
ments (i.e. output variables) differ in a fundamental way
from variables which can be controlled by local agents,
because they are determined by the probabilistic collapse
process rather than by deterministic local processes.
With this distinction in hand, I define a local experi-
ment as a pair of events: an input variable is set to some
value and an output variable assumes some value. I will
assume that an experiment is effectively instantaneous,
so input and output variables are defined at the same
spacetime point, but this idealization could be relaxed
without significantly changing the arguments. I will also
assume that there exist spacetime points at which these
events take place, and that at least some pairs of spacetime
points stand in spatiotemporal relations to one another,
but because I want to avoid presuppositions about the na-
ture of spacetime, I will make only minimal assumptions
about the nature of these relations. In particular, I will
assume that these relations have at least enough structure
to render coherent the distinction between symmetric and
asymmetric processes which I introduce in section 2.4,
and I will assume the existence of an arrow of time, so
that it is sometimes possible to say that one event is in
the past of another. Since both of these distinctions are
instantiated in our actual universe, it seems reasonable to
assume that whatever the underlying reality of spacetime
may be, it does indeed realize these distinctions, albeit
perhaps only in an emergent sense.
Local experiments may be combined to form processes,
as in the process framework introduced in [12], which
specifies probabilities for the outcomes of local experi-
ments without assuming the existence of a global causal
order between experiments. In this framework, a process
is defined by specifying the set of conditional probabil-
ities for the relevant input and output variables, i.e. a
complete set of probabilities of the form p(OA = a,OB =
b, . . . |NA = a′,NB = b′, . . . ;wAB...) where Nx is an input
variable, OX is an output variable, and wAB... is the vari-
able that defines the global setup in which the individual
experiments take place. Hence these conditional proba-
bilities are necessarily identical for any implementation
of the process.
Since a given process may have multiple input vari-
ables, henceforth I will write the input variables for a
given process as a vector N, and the complete set of pos-
sible values for these variables as a set of vectors N .
Likewise I will write the output variables for a given
process as a vector O, with the complete set of possible
values for these variables given by the set of vectors O .
2.3 Accessible and global variables
Because we are spatiotemporal beings, we can only per-
form experiments involving accessible variables, i.e. vari-
ables which are defined over a proper subset of the space-
time points in the universe and can therefore be accessed
by observers localized over proper subsets of the space-
time points in the universe. However if the world is
governed by global laws it is possible that experimental
outcomes may also depend on global variables which
cannot even in principle be accessed or manipulated at
any finite set of spacetime points, perhaps because they
describe the relation of a given instance of a process to
the rest of the universe, or because they are defined by
global topology; for example, if it were possible to define
a classical action for the entire universe over the whole
of history, that action would be a global variable. While
this proposal may at first seem a significant conceptual
leap, note that it is already almost a commonplace that
entanglement implies the existence of properties of dis-
tributed systems which are not reducible to any collection
of properties of subsystems; [11, 13, 14] our proposed
global variables take this notion one step further, since,
according to the hypothesis proposed, such properties
cannot be accessed even by a sufficiently large and dis-
tributed set of observers, but nonetheless the phenomenon
of entanglement provides at least some precedent for this
way of thinking about distributed properties.
I will therefore extend the process framework by allow-
ing that in addition to the usual accessible input variables,
a process may also have global input variables, so we now
have a full set of input variables V which may be split
into a vector of accessible input variables N taking values
in the set N , and a vector of global input variables Q
taking values in the setQ. However, since global input
variables cannot be accessed or manipulated at any small
region of spacetime, it is still true that as in the standard
process framework, the accessible input variables N pro-
vide the only means of information exchange between
local experiments.
A word of caution: the distinction made here between
accessible variables and global variables is not the same
as the distinction made in relativistic quantum theory
between local variables and nonlocal variables. In rel-
ativistic quantum theory, a local variable is a variable
related to only one small region of space whilst a nonlo-
cal variable is a variable related to several distinct small
regions of space—but since such nonlocal variables in
quantum mechanics (apart from variables related to the
spread-out fermionic wave function) can be measured by
local observers who coordinate their actions and subse-
quently share information [15], these nonlocal variables
are still accessible variables in my terminology. Indeed,
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no variables currently defined by quantum mechanics or
quantum field theory are global variables in my sense,
since all can be measured by appropriately distributed
collections of observers such as ourselves.
2.4 Spatiotemporally symmetric processes
It is an important feature of our experience that many
types of processes which we encounter have a natural
temporal direction, namely, the inputs and outputs are
correlated in a certain way only if the sites at which the
parts of the process occur stand in a certain asymmetric
spatiotemporal relation to one another. For example, in
a process where one device sends an electromagnetic
signal to a second device, the correlations depend on
whether or not the second device is operated after the
signal from the first has had time to arrive. However, in
quantum mechanics we encounter processes which are
spatiotemporally symmetric:
Definition 2.1. A process is spatiotemporally symmetric
if the correlations between input and output variables
remain unchanged under any permutation of the sites at
which the parts of the process take place.
For example, the process of performing measurements
on an entangled state is spatiotemporally symmetric, be-
cause the only constraint on the spatiotemporal relation
between the measurement sites is that both must lie in
the future lightcone of the point at which the entangled
state was prepared, and this constraint is symmetric with
respect to the two measurements, so if we interchange
the two measurement sites, the same correlations will
still be observed. Indeed, any process where we perform
measurements on two distinct quantum systems will be
spatiotemporally symmetric, since the probabilities for
the outcomes of quantum measurements performed on
distinct quantum systems do not depend on the time or
place of the measurement. The fact that measurements
on two distinct non-interacting quantum systems are spa-
tiotemporally symmetric is implied by the fact that the
algebras of observables for distinct non-interacting quan-
tum systems commute (this is sometimes known as mi-
crocausality or kinematic independence [16]). However,
the commutativity of observables is a stronger constraint
than spatiotemporal symmetry: one could imagine a spa-
tiotemporally symmetric process where the algebras of
observables would fail to commute, such as a set of mea-
surements on some post-quantum entangled state of sys-
tems A and B where the outcome of the measurement on
B depends on the choice of the measurement made on A
even if the measurement on A is spacelike separated from
or in the causal future of the measurement on B.
Of course, the distinction made here depends on our
earlier distinction between input and output variables—
given a process which is not spatiotemporally symmetric,
if we could simply swap the inputs and the outputs, then
the asymmetry would disappear. Thus the distinction be-
tween spatiotemporally-symmetric and spatiotemporally-
asymmetric processes is, like the distinction between in-
put and output variables, an agent-relative one: agents
with a very different physical realisation might pick
out different classes of spatiotemporally-symmetric pro-
cesses.
Note that given a process which is not spatiotemporally
symmetric, we can always use the asymmetry to assign
a unique temporal order to the parts of the process, so
without making additional assumptions about the nature
of the embedding spacetime we can say that, given any
pair of such events, one event must lie in the past of the
other. The same may not necessarily be true of pairs of
events which form part of a spatiotemporally symmetric
process.
2.5 Global determinism
From Einstein onwards, [17] many physicists have hoped
to find a way of making quantum mechanics compatible
with determinism. However this project has encountered
numerous difficulties, not least because the very notion
of determinism is in need of some updating.
Giving a definition of determinism is notoriously diffi-
cult, [5, § 3] but typical proposals require that all space-
time points to the future of a given spacelike hyperplane
Σ are fully determined by the conditions on Σ together
with the laws of the theory. But the assumption that
the entire universe can be understood as an initial value
problem [18] seems unwarranted: it has been argued el-
swhere [1, 3] that we should take seriously the hypothesis
that “the universe (runs) not as a computer, but as a global
four-dimensional problem that (is) solved all at once.” [1]
In light of such possibilities, it seems we would be better
served by a less restrictive notion that one might refer to
as global determinism.
To give an intuitive picture of what the notion of global
determinism entails, I suggest the following analogy. In a
globally deterministic world, the laws of nature prescribe
a unique course of history in the same way as a properly
set up game of sudoku has a unique solution; the laws
of nature govern the whole course of history at once,
rather than moment-by-moment, in the same way as the
rules of the game of sudoku apply to the whole grid at
once, rather than dictating the entries column by column.
Indeed, if a completed sudoku square were to be revealed
column by column to an observer who could not see the
whole square at once, each column would appear to be
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related to the previous one in a probabilistic way (there
would be obvious patterns of dependence which could
be described by probabilistic rules, but there would not
usually be enough information available to determine the
next column exactly), and I suggest that similarly, the
apparently probabilistic nature of quantum theory is a
consequence of our inability to see the whole picture.
The task of giving a precise definition for global de-
terminism is likely to inherit many of the difficulties of
defining conventional determinism, with the additional
difficulty that we currently have little idea what form glob-
ally deterministic laws of nature might take. Thus rather
than providing a formal definition of global determinism,
I will instead make the notion mathematically precise by
working with what I take to be a necessary condition for
global determinism:
Necessary condition for global determinism:
For any process P with output variables O tak-
ing values in O , there exists a set of (accessible
and/or global) input variables V taking values
in V , and a function f P : V → O such that
if process P is performed with the (accessible
and/or global) input variables taking values
v ∈ V , then we obtain output variables o ∈ O
such that o = f P(v).
Notes
1. There exist well-defined relative frequencies for the
values of variables defined with respect to processes,
so we can specify frequentist probability distribu-
tions over variables and hence employ entropic quan-
tities [19] such as H(O), H(O|N) and I(O : N) with-
out invoking a notion of objective probability. In this
language, the condition above may be restated as the
requirement that if process P has input variables V
and output variables O, then H(O|V) = 0.
Here, H denotes the Shannon entropy, which is de-
fined as H(O) := −∑o p(O = o) log(p(O = o));
H(O|Q) denotes the conditional Shannon entropy,
which is defined as H(O|Q) := ∑o,q p(Q = q)p(O =
o|Q = q) log(p(O = o|Q = q)); and I(A : B) denotes
the Shannon mutual information, which is defined
as I(A : B) :=
∑
x,y p(A = x, B = y) log
p(A=x,B=y)
p(A=x)p(B=y) .
2. The statistical data on which quantum mechanics is
based comes from experiments in which some pa-
rameter is varied and the correlations between inputs
and outputs are observed. Because the hypothesis of
global determinism is supposed to be an explanation
for these statistics, I will henceforth assume that in
any such experimental process, the apparent depen-
dence of the outputs on the inputs is real and that the
apparent level of dependence is as it appears in the
experimental statistics, i.e. if we find experimentally
that I(O : N) = x for O some output variable, N
some input variable, and x some constant, then the
relation I(O : N) = x is implied by the function f P.
I will also assume that the accessible input variables
are statistically independent of one another and of
all other variables on which the function f P depends,
e.g. for a process with a single accessible input vari-
able N and a single accessible output variable O, if
we denote the set of all other variables on which f P
depends by Q, we have I(ON : Q) = I(O : Q|N)
since I(N : Q) = 0. See section 6.1 for further
discussion of these assumptions.
3. Since we require that the functional relation between
inputs and outputs is the same for any instantiation
of a given process, it follows that if two processes
P1 and P2 are combined, with the accessible output
variables O1 for process P1 being used as the ac-
cessible input variables N2 for process P2, then the
accessible output variables O2 for process P2 must
be a function of the full set of accessible and global
input variables N1,Q1 for process P1 together with
the global variables Q2 for process two, i.e. if the
composition is performed with the accessible input
variables for P1 taking values n1 and the global in-
put variables for the two processes taking values q1
and q2, then for process P1 we obtain output vari-
ables o1 = f P1(v1, q1) and for process two we obtain
output variables o2 = f P2( f P1(v1, q1), q2) for some
functions f P1 , f P2 .
However there exist more general ways of compos-
ing processes—we may choose to use the output
variables of one process to determine only a proper
subset of the input variables for another process,
and indeed, in later sections we will see that it is
sometimes possible to use a subset of the output
variables of P1 to determine a proper subset of the
input variables of P2 and also use a subset of the
output variables of P2 to determine a proper subset
of the input variables of P1. For these more complex
compositions it is natural to require that the full set
of output variables for the joint processes should be
a function of all remaining input variables, i.e. we
require the following:
Definition 2.2. Global determinism under com-
position: Consider two processes Pi : i ∈ {0, 1},
with accessible input variables Ni taking values in
Ni, global input variables Qi taking values in Qi,
and accessible output variables Oi taking values in
Oi, for which it is possible to construct a composi-
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tion Pm12 in which the subset of variables O
m
1 ⊆ O1
are used to fix the subset of variables Nm2 ⊆ N2 and
the subset of variables Om2 ⊆ O2 are used to fix the
subset of variables Nm1 ⊆ N1. If the world is glob-
ally deterministic, there exists a function f P1,P2,m :
{(N1 \N m1 ) ⊗ (N2 \N m2 ) ⊗Q1 ⊗Q2} → O1 ⊗O2,
such that when Pm12 is performed with the acces-
sible input variables equal to n1 ∈ (N1 \ N m1 )
and n2 ∈ (N2 \ N m2 ), and global input variables
equal to q1 ∈ Q1 and q2 ∈ Q2, we obtain output
variables o1 ⊗ o2 ∈ O1 ⊗ O2 such that o1 ⊗ o2 =
f P1,P2,m(n1 ⊗ n2 ⊗ q1 ⊗ q2).
3 Outline
A spatiotemporally symmetric process P can be used to
produce a loop by performing the same process twice
over and allowing the accessible output variables from
one process to determine the accessible input variables
for the other, and vice versa.
For example, consider a process which can be mod-
elled by two black boxes, with the first box taking an
input N at some spacetime point and the second box pro-
ducing an output O at some other spacetime point. If
global determinism holds, the output O for process P
must be a function of N and possibly also some global
input variables Q. Now consider constructing two copies
of the boxes required to implement process P: boxes X1
and X2 and boxes Y1 and Y2. We may then compose the
two processes as depicted in Fig. 1: Alice takes boxes
X1 and Y2 and Bob takes boxes X2 and Y1, then at some
spacetime point, Alice obtains Ox from X1 and uses the
value of Ox to choose the input Ny for box Y2, while at
some other spacetime point, Bob obtains Oy from Y1 and
uses the value of Oy to choose the input Nx for box X2.
Under the composition rule for global determinism, the
outcome variables Ox,Oy are a function of the global vari-
ables Qx,Qy only. But if the output variables O for this
process depend too strongly on the accessible input vari-
ables N for the process, then under this composition there
will not be enough information in the global variables
Qx,Qy to fix the values of the variables Ox,Oy, so global
determinism will fail. Hence global determinism imposes
strict constraints on the correlations which can hold be-
tween output variables and accessible input variables for
spatiotemporally symmetric processes.
One consequence is that spatiotemporally symmetric
processes must obey the no-signaling principle. For if a
spatiotemporally symmetric process were to violate the
no-signaling principle, a composition as in Fig. 1 could
be used to produce a closed causal loop: Alice could






Figure 1: Schematic diagram of the composition of two pro-
cesses used in the proof of theorem 4.2
the message on to Bob, who could then use the signaling
process to return the message to Alice. The content of
the message would be its own cause and therefore would
not be a function of the values of variables elsewhere in
the universe, in violation of the necessary condition for
global determinism. We have thus given a heuristic argu-
ment suggesting that in a globally deterministic universe
the correlations exhibited by accessible variables in spa-
tiotemporally symmetric processes must always satisfy
the no-signaling principle; this argument is formalised in
the following section.
4 No-signaling
Despite the well-documented conceptual tension between
quantum mechanics and special relativity [2, 20], the two
theories never make predictions which are in outright con-
tradiction. It is usually argued that this is a consequence
of the fact that both quantum mechanics and special rela-
tivity satisfy the no-signaling principle, but some caution
is called for here, because the no-signaling principles
obeyed by the two theories are not precisely identical.
In special relativity, the term refers to the fact that the
theory predicts that no signal can be transmitted faster
than light [21]. In quantum mechanics, it refers to the fact
that the algebra of observables for distinct non-interacting
physical systems must commute, and hence when two
quantum systems are in an entangled state the expectation
value of an operator describing a measurement performed
on the second particle does not depend on any transforma-
tion or measurement applied to the first particle [22].The
quantum no-signaling theorem does not imply the rela-
tivistic prediction, even if we assume that everything in
nature can be described by quantum mechanics, because
the quantum principle constrains only the transmission
of information via measurements on entangled systems,
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and thus places no limits on the transmission of informa-
tion by other means, such as physical signals travelling
from one point to another. Nor does the relativistic pre-
diction imply the quantum-mechanical theorem, because
the relativistic prediction has implications only for the
results of measurements made on systems at a spacelike
separation, whereas the quantum theorem is independent
of the spatiotemporal location of the measurements in
question. Indeed, the analogue of the no-signaling theo-
rem in quantum field theory is normally taken to be the
statement that observables defined on regions of space-
time separated by a spacelike interval commute [23], but
once again this statement only has implications for the re-
sults of measurements made at a spacelike separation, and
is thus in some sense weaker than the original quantum
no-signaling theorem.
To close the gap between the quantum and relativis-
tic formulations of no-signaling, we need to invoke the
additional fact that measurements on entangled quantum
systems exhibit the same statistical features independent
of the spatiotemporal relation between the measurements,
i.e. measurements performed on distinct quantum sys-
tems always constitute a spatiotemporally symmetric pro-
cess. This suggests a way of subsuming the key ideas
from these different formulations of no-signaling under a
single principle:
Definition 4.1. Generalized no-signaling principle:
Consider a spatiotemporally symmetric process involving
a set of devices {Di} : i ∈ {1 . . .N} operating at distinct
spacetime points {Pi}, such that at point Pi device Di
accepts an accessible input variable Ni and produces an
accessible output variable Oi. Let J be any subset of
{1 . . .N}, let OJ be the set of variables {O j : j ∈ J}, let NJ
be the set of variables {N j : j ∈ J}, and letP be the set
of variables defined at points which are in the past of all
the points Pi. Then if the inputs {Ni} are uncorrelated, the
outcomes satisfy p(OJ |N1, . . . ,Nn,P) = p(OJ |NJ ,P).
Notes
1. As before, this definition depends crucially on the
distinction between input and output variables, and
therefore the definition must be understood relative
to some set of agents. This is not particularly sur-
prising, since the notion of signaling is implicitly
dependent on notion of agency—a signal is simply
a variable whose value a given agent is able to ex-
ert control over, perhaps locally or perhaps at some
spatiotemporal distance.
2. It follows that a spatiotemporally symmetric pro-
cess obeys the generalized no-signaling principle
iff for any set of inputs N and any set of outputs O
which are accepted and produced respectively at non-
overlapping sets of points, the mutual information
I(O : N |P) is zero (provided that the process is per-
formed with uncorrelated inputs) [24]. For brevity,
P will henceforth be omitted.
3. In formulating the relativistic no-signaling princi-
ple, it is common to conditionalize on the set of
variables in the past lightcone of the points Pi in
order to rule out any possibility of a joint common
cause explanation for the correlations (e.g. see [25]).
To avoid assumptions about the nature of the back-
ground spacetime in which the devices operate, that
conditionalization is here replaced with a condition-
alization on the set of all variables which are in the
past of the variables at the points Pi.
4. The generalized principle implies the quantum-
mechanical no-signaling principle, because any pair
of measurements performed on two distinct quantum
systems is spatiotemporally symmetric. Of course
consecutive measurements performed on the same
system are not spatiotemporally symmetric, but this
is not a problem for the approach set out here, be-
cause the algebras of observables on individual quan-
tum systems are not commutative and hence may
indeed be signaling.
5. The generalized principle does not imply that no
signal can be transmitted faster than light, but if we
believe that the universe contains a finite number of
types of spatiotemporally asymmetric process, the
generalized principle does imply that signals cannot
be transmitted faster than some universal maximum
speed, i.e. the fastest speed associated with any spa-
tiotemporal process. We are free to hypothesize that
in our universe this happens to be the speed of light,
thus obtaining the relativistic no-signaling principle;
the field-theoretic no-signaling principle could also
be obtained by similar reasoning. (Note that this
does not require us to make the unwarranted assump-
tion that the universe itself is finite, as we could
have an infinite number of instances of a finite num-
ber of types of process; essentially, the assumption
required is that the laws of nature may be finitely
specified, even if the universe is infinite).
I now demonstrate that the generalized no-signaling
principle can be derived from the hypothesis of global
determinism under the assumptions we have made here.
A similar approach was used by Arntzenius [26] to derive
a variant of no-signaling from a prohibition on closed
causal loops, but that derivation applies to probabilistic
theories and is therefore threatened by ambiguities about
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the behaviour of probabilities under composition [27];
assuming global determinism allows us to circumvent
these difficulties.
Theorem 4.2. If the world is globally deterministic, then
any spatiotemporally symmetric process P must satisfy
the generalized no-signaling principle for all its accessi-
ble input variables.
We will need the following lemma:
Lemma 4.3. If N and Q are statistically independent and
O is a function of N and Q, then H(O) = I(O : N)+I(NO :
Q).
Proof. Since O is a function of N and Q, H(O|NQ) = 0,
and thus from Bayes’ rule H(NQ|O) + H(O) = H(NQ).
Using the chain rule for conditional entropy, we obtain
H(N|O) + H(Q|NO) + H(O) = H(NQ). Since N and Q
are statistically independent, H(NQ) = H(N) + H(Q).
Thus H(O) = H(N)−H(N |O)+ H(Q)−H(Q|NO) = I(O :
N) + I(NO : Q). 
Thus we may proceed with the proof of theorem 4.2:
Proof. Consider any spatiotemporally symmetric process
P in which an accessible input variable N is accepted
at one point and an accessible output variable O is pro-
duced at a distinct point. We assume that the world is
globally deterministic, so O is a function of N and pos-
sibly also some additional variables Q. Since process P
is symmetric, it can be used to construct a cyclic process
as in Fig. 1. From the composition rule (2.2), we have
H(OyOx|QxQy) = 0, and hence H(OyOx) = I(OyOx :
QxQy). From the definition of the mutual information,
H(OyOx) = H(Oy) + H(Ox) − I(Oy : Ox). In this con-
struction, I(Oy : Ox) = I(Oy : Ny) = I(O : N), so
H(OyOx) = 2H(O) − I(O : N). Since Ox is a func-
tion of Nx and Qx and Oy is a function of Ny and Qy,
I(OyOx : QxQy) ≤ I(NyOy : Qy) + I(NxOx : Qx) =
2I(NO : Q). Since O is a function of N and Q, and
N and Q are independent, from lemma 4.3 we have
H(O) = I(O : N) + I(NO : Q). Combining the above re-
sults, we obtain: 2H(O)− I(O : N) ≤ 2H(O)− 2I(O : N).
Hence I(O : N) ≤ 0. But the Shannon mutual information
is nonnegative, so I(O : N) = 0, and thus by applying the
first note on 4.1, we conclude that this process must be
non-signaling. 
Note that the proof applies for the case of a process
which takes an input at some point and produces an out-
put at another point. It is more common to discuss no-
signaling with respect to processes where at each of two
separate points an input is provided and an output is pro-
duced; for example, when we perform measurements on
a Bell pair, the two choices of measurement direction are
the inputs and the measurement results are the outputs.
However, clearly the former type of process can always
be produced from the latter by simply fixing the value
of one input and ignoring the value of one output, so the
same proof applies in the more general case.
5 Objections
5.1 Records
One possible criticism of the concept of global determin-
ism is that if the value of a variable can be determined
by states of affairs at any other point in space or time,
then the outcome of every experiment would be trivially
determined by any subsequent records of the outcome,
so any world in which records exist would qualify as
globally deterministic. I have a simple response to this
objection: such an arrangement would indeed be con-
sistent with the notion of global determinism, but if the
outcome of a reproducible process were fixed by some
subsequent record of that outcome, that record could not
also be fixed by the outcome, since otherwise the outcome
and record would together form a closed causal loop, and
as argued in section 3, closed causal loops cannot exist
in a globally deterministic universe. Hence under such
circumstances the record would itself necessarily be fixed
by the value of some other variable(s), X, and hence we
could equally well say that the outcome and record are
jointly determined by X, thus rendering the notion of
global determinism nontrivial.
5.2 Global variables vs hidden variables
Since the global nature of the postulated global vari-
ables played no explicit role in the derivation of the no-
signaling principle, it is reasonable to ask why these vari-
ables need to be global, rather than simply inaccessible
like hidden variables in interpretations such as the de
Broglie Bohm interpretation [28].
However, the defining feature of the global variables,
postulated here is that when a global variable is an input
to some process, it is not possible to set that global vari-
able to be a function of the output to some other process,
so global variables cannot be used to form closed loops in
constructions like that employed in section 4. Although I
described the construction of these loops in terms of the
actions of agents Alice and Bob, these arguments would
apply in the same way to natural or spontaneous evolu-
tions in which the output of one process becomes the input
to another, and therefore in a globally deterministic uni-
verse, the variables that I refer to as global variables must
be inaccessible not only to observers such as ourselves
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but to all processes which take place within the universe.
This leaves two alternatives: either the variables depend
on the entire course of history and thus are inaccessible
to all temporal processes, or they are simply outside the
universe, in the sense that they influence the outcomes of
processes inside the universe but themselves can never be
influenced by any events taking place inside the universe.
The latter possibility is a dead end scientifically, as it
would essentially be no different to postulating that the
outcomes of these processes are random, and it also vio-
lates a well-established heuristic principle known as the
action-reaction principle—as Einstein put it, postulating
that one physical entity acts on another without a corre-
sponding reaction is “contrary to the mode of thinking in
science.” [29, 30]. Thus I prefer to interpret these results
in terms of global variables, which are theoretically more
elegant and more conducive to scientific progress.
In addition, in light of modern physics it seems very
natural to suppose that the world is in fact described
by global laws (see [1] and [3]). From that point of
view, the existence of global variables may be regarded
as the starting point for this work, and the results may
be interpreted as evidence that the world might in fact be
deterministic when these global variables and laws are
taken into account.
5.3 Learning about global variables
If it is the case that global variables help to fix the out-
comes of local experiments in certain kinds of processes,
then those processes must have nonzero mutual infor-
mation I(O : Q) between the accessible outputs and the
relevant global variables. Yet mutual information is sym-
metric, so this implies that the outcomes of local experi-
ments gives us information about the values of the global
variables, which seems to contradict the stipulation that
global variables should be strictly inaccessible.
But in fact there is no contradiction here. Global vari-
ables are composed from accessible variables, and there-
fore the accessible variables must certainly provide infor-
mation about these global variables, but the information
is of such a kind that it is not usable unless we have access
to the full set of relevant accessible input variables. As
a simple example, imagine a type of process which has
an apparently random outcome labelled by +1 or −1, and
consider a global law which requires that the parity of
the set of all the outcomes for all such events occurring
throughout history must be equal to +1. A sufficiently
complex set of such constraints could fix the outcome for
every individual process uniquely, and yet the outcome of
any individual process gives no information whatsoever
about the parity of the whole sequence unless we already
know the outcomes of all the other iterations throughout
history. The global variable here is not the parity P of the
sequence, since for any individual outcome I(O : P) = 0,
but rather a complete description of all the other con-
straints which apply to events in the sequence and which
jointly fix all the outcomes in the sequence uniquely.
This might sound counterintuitive, but behaviour of
this kind is in fact very common in quantum mechanics.
As noted in section 2.3, global variables are somewhat
analogous to entangled states in the sense that they are not
reducible to properties of the individual subsystems, and
indeed, a similar phenomenon occurs with entangled par-
ticles: if we are given a pair of qubits A, B in an unknown
maximally entangled state ψ, and we measure both parti-
cles in the same direction, then specifying the state ψ and
the outcome of the measurement on qubit A uniquely de-
termines the outcome of the measurement on qubit B, yet
the outcome of the measurement on qubit B alone gives
no information whatsoeverabout the state ψ. Another
example is the phenomenon of quantum secret sharing—
it is possible to divide a quantum message into N parts
such that for some integer m ∈ [dN2 e,N], any collection of
fewer than m parts gives no information at all about the
message, but the message is determined uniquely by any
collection of m or greater parts [31, 32]. Our concept of
global variables may be regarded as a natural extension
of these well-understood features of quantum theory.
5.4 Initial conditions
Historically, determinism has been taken to imply that the
history of the universe is fixed by the laws of nature to-
gether with an appropriate set of initial conditions, usually
identified with the state of the universe at the beginning
of time, and it seems likely that a world which is glob-
ally deterministic would likewise require some sort of
initial conditions in order for the course of history to be
determined uniquely—returning to the earlier analogy, re-
call that a sudoku square does not have a unique solution
unless an at least 17 squares are initially filled in [33].
Detailed answers to questions about the nature of the
initial conditions for global determinism must wait upon
specific proposals for the form of the globally determin-
istic laws, but I will briefly mention some possibilities.
It might be that our inability to conceive of laws of na-
ture which do not demand initial conditions is simply
a failure of imagination. Alternatively, it might be the
case that there exist some small set of variables in the
universe which are not fixed by other variables: these
would have the same status as initial conditions in tra-
ditional formulations of determinism, but, moving away
from the explicitly temporal character of traditional de-
terminism, they are no longer required to occur at the
start of time. For example, in a world governed by laws
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of nature requiring the optimization of a global variable
akin to a classical action for the entire universe over the
whole of history, the relevant initial conditions would be
the boundaries of the entire universe, i.e. conditions at
both the start and end of time. The existence of these
variables would not be inconsistent with the hypothesis
of global determinism, because the need to postulate ini-
tial conditions is not usually viewed as an objection to
the traditional notion of determinism, and the concept of
global determinism is only intended to be an update of
this notion, not a logically stronger or more demanding
concept.
5.5 No-go theorems
Finally, it is common to object that one or another of the
quantum-mechanical no-go theorems rules out the possi-
bility of a deterministic model for quantum theory. Here
I briefly review the relevant no-go theorems and explain
why they do not pose a challenge to global determinism.
5.5.1 Bell’s theorem
Bell’s theorem [34] shows that no hidden variable the-
ory, which is constrained to obey the principle of spatial
locality, can reproduce all the predictions of quantum me-
chanics. But one of the governing principles behind the
approach I have adopted here is that one should not expect
hidden variables to obey constraints of spatial or temporal
locality. Indeed, on this view of the world nonlocality is
the norm, and the phenomenon that demands explanation
is not the nonlocality which is manifested in violations of
Bell’s inequality, but rather the specific limits on nonlo-
cality which are manifested in the no-signaling principle.
Thus Bell’s theorem does not pose difficulties for the
proposed globally deterministic universe, for in such a
universe one would naturally expect nonlocality to be
ubiquitous.
5.5.2 Randomness in quantum theory
Colbeck [35] has observed that from the no-signaling
principle, it follows that if some measurement outcomes
violates a Bell inequality, these outcomes must be in-
herently random. This fact has since been employed to
develop protocols for device-independent randomness ex-
pansion [36, 37]. It might seem that such results are in
tension, if not outright contradiction, with the claim that
the no-signaling principle itself follows from global de-
terminism. However, there is no real contradiction here,
because the proof in [35] shows only that the outcomes
must be random in the sense that they are independent of
any variable which could be used to perform signaling,
i.e. any accessible input variable. This is not inconsistent
with the claim that they are deterministic when we take
into account global variables which are not accessible.
Indeed, these results indicate that the apparent random-
ness of quantum mechanics may actually be viewed as a
consequence of the global determinism of the theory: mul-
tiple authors [35–37] show that randomness arising from
measurements on entangled systems is a necessary con-
sequence of the no-signaling theorem, so if it is accepted
that no-sigalling is a consequence of global determinism
then this sort of randomness is also a perspectival effect
which follows from global determinism.
5.5.3 The Colbeck–Renner theorem
Renner and Colbeck [38] have a theorem to the effect that
no extension of quantum mechanics can have greater pre-
dictive power than standard quantum mechanics. At first
glance, this would seem to rule out global determinism,
since the extension of quantum mechanics supplemented
with the full set of variables which make the outcomes
deterministic would clearly have greater predictive power
than standard quantum mechanics. However, as Lands-
man discusses in detail [39], the result of Renner and
Colbeck is based on a number of assumptions about the
nature of the extension which may seem unreasonably
strong. Moreover, the term predictive power is used here
to refer to predictability in practice rather than merely
in principle, as the proof assumes that the putative ex-
tension is accessible to ordinary obserers and therefore
obeys no-signaling constraints. For example, Renner and
Colbeck use no-signaling to argue that for a pair of mea-
surements with settings A, B and outcomes X,Y , if the
putative extension is described by variables C,Z, then we
must have p(A|BCYZ) = p(A), since otherwise it would
be possible to signal using A to a spacelike separated
observer who chooses B,C and has access to Y,Z. But if
the variables C,Z are global ones, then it is not possible
for any single observer who is spacelike separated from
A to learn all the values B,C,Y and Z, so the no-signaling
constraint need not hold. The key point is that in a practi-
cal sense, a globally deterministic theory would not have
greater predictive power than quantum theory, since the
extra variables which make the theory deterministic are
not available to be used for predictions, and thus Ren-
ner and Colbeck’s result does not pose a problem for the
postulation of global determinism.
5.5.4 Contextuality
The Kochen–Specker theorem [40] rules out the possibil-
ity of outcome deterministic noncontextual hidden vari-
able models, i.e. models employing “hidden variables
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which fix the outcome of each unsharp measurement (in
a context independent manner),” [41] That is, in Hilbert
spaces of dimension greater than two, it is possible to
construct sets of observables for which it is impossible
to assign values 1 and 0 consistently to every observable
in the set such that in every possible measurement which
can be constructed from this set of observables, exactly
one observable is assigned the value 1, [42] which means
that any deterministic hidden-variable model for quantum
theory must be contextual, in the sense that measurement
results sometimes depend on the context of measurement.
This no-go theorem does not pose a problem for global
determinism, because although it implies the existence
hidden variables which fix the outcome of each unsharp
measurement, it does not follow that the resulting model
should be noncontextual. Indeed, the existence of contex-
tuality is very natural in this framework: the hypothesis of
global determinism implies that in general, the outcome
of an experiment will depend not only on accessible in-
put variables but also on facts about the relation between
that experiment and other events throughout history, and
the context of measurement is precisely such a relational
fact, so it is to be expected that different measurement
contexts may give rise to different results. Note, however,
that the context of measurement is not a global variable,
in the sense in which I use that term, because observers
such as ourselves can observe and manipulate variables
describing which measurement is being performed.
6 Assumptions
Below, I discuss some of my assumptions in greater detail.
6.1 Independent variables
The statistical data on which quantum mechanics is based
comes from experiments in which some input parameter
is varied and the correlations between inputs and outputs
are observed. Of course it is always possible that the
input and output are together a function of some third set
of variables, so the apparent statistical dependence results
from a common cause relationship, but in this paper I
have assumed that the measurement settings for quan-
tum mechanical experiments are always among the set of
variables of which the outcome is a function, and are inde-
pendent of the other variables in this set. This assumption
should not be too controversial, since assumptions of this
kind are ubiquitous throughout science. Indeed, indepen-
dently chosen variables already play an important role
in the contemporary understanding of nonlocality, since
there is a meaningful notion of nonlocal correlations only
when experimenters can make free choices of experiment
in different spatial locations. In particular, it is possible
to violate a Bell inequality only by performing measure-
ments in different bases [43], and the derivation of a Bell
inequality requires the assumption that the bases can be
chosen freely and independently [34]. This assumption
is sometimes referred to as free will, [44], but in fact it
does not depend on any metaphysical assertions about
free will, since it is simply a statement about the statisti-
cal relation between certain sets of variables. That said,
the usual free will assumption requires that the values of
freely chosen variables have implications only in their
future light cones, which implies that these variables are
uncorrelated with all variables in their past light cones.
In this article I do not need to make such a strong unphys-
ical claim: I assume only that the measurement settings
for quantum experiments are independent from a specific
set of variables, not from everything that has occurred in
the past, and therefore the assumption I make is in fact
substantially weaker than the widely accepted free will
assumption.
Another possible concern is that in a globally deter-
ministic world no two variables would ever be truly in-
dependent, since every set of variables would depend on
every other set of variables in a global sense. However
it is possible for two sets of variables to be statistically
independent even if they become dependent when condi-
tioned on some further information (consider for example
the phenomenon of hidden nonlocality [43]) and there-
fore it is entirely consistent to make this assumption in
conjunction with the assumption of global determinism.
6.2 Closure
Our derivation requires the assumption that for a given
process, the functional relation between the inputs V and
the outputs O does not depend on the way in which the in-
puts are chosen. In particular, I assume that experimenters
are free to connect up their boxes in any way compatible
with special relativity, and that that the boxes function in
the same way no matter how they have been connected.
This assumption is related to the requirement of closure
under wirings, originally introduced in the study of non-
local boxes [45], which is not usually regarded as contro-
versial. Moreoever, I argue that this assumption and the
independence assumption discussed earlier are together
the minimal assumptions which are consistent with the
possibility of making meaningful counterfactual asser-
tions about how our measurement results would have
been different under different circumstances, and the sci-
entific method depends crucially on this possibility.
I also assume a stronger closure principle, namely, the
world must remain globally deterministic under all possi-
ble compositions of boxes. This assumption is a natural
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one if it is accepted that global determinism is a funda-
mental property of the laws of nature, since then the world
must remain globally deterministic under any composi-
tion that is actually performed, and thus if experimenters
are free to perform any classically allowable composition
it follows immediately that the world must remain glob-
ally deterministic under the cyclic compositions used in
the derivation above.
6.3 Unique outcomes
Finally, I have assumed that when a quantum measure-
ment is performed, only one outcome actually occurs.
This is certainly the common-sense view, but it is not
true within the Everett interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics, and therefore the Everett approach is not compatible
with this way of explaining the information-theoretic fea-
tures of quantum theory. If the explanation is regarded
as a plausible one, this might be viewed as an argument
against the Everett interpretation, since the apparent fine-
turning of the no-signaling principle remains unexplained
within the Everett picture.
7 Conclusion
I have given an argument to the effect that in a globally
deterministic universe, processes which are spatiotempo-
rally symmetric (with respect to a certain class of agents)
must also be non-signaling (with respect to that same
class of agents). Given that quantum measurement pro-
cesses are spatiotemporally symmetric with respect to
agents like us, this immediately implies that if the uni-
verse is globally deterministic, quantum measurement
processes must be non-signaling with respect to agents
like us, thus providing a simple, physically realistic expla-
nation for the apparently fine-tuned nature of no-signaling
correlations.
The explanation suggested here depends crucially on
the specific capabilities of a class of agents, and hence this
argument suggests that one might regard the no-signaling
property as a perspectival phenomenon. However, I wish
to reinforce that this perspectival approach is not intended
to be an argument in favour of instrumentalism or antire-
alism, and it does not require us to suppose that agents
are somehow unphysical or specially privileged relative
to the rest of the universe. The idea is simply that agents
have a certain physical realisation, and thus there are
objective facts about which sorts of variables they can
and cannot manipulate, which leads naturally to objec-
tive constraints on the kinds of phenomena that they can
and cannot observe. Indeed, signaling is clearly an agent-
relative concept, and hence it seems almost inevitable that
the supposed universal prohibition on signaling should
in some sense turn out to be a perspectival feature of the
experience of agents rather than a truly universal feature
of all possible correlations.
A number of directions for future research are sug-
gested by the approach discussed here. A further im-
plication of the paper’s main result is that in a globally
deterministic universe, a process which does allow signal-
ing for a certain class of agents must necessarily fail to
be spatiotemporally symmetric for that class of agents. It
follows that if it is possible to send information forwards
in time via some signaling process, then that same process
cannot be used to send information backwards in time.
Further work would be required to fully cash out this
argument, but it seems possible that the prohibition on
closed causal loops could thus be used to explain why it is
that we can signal only in one temporal direction, which
might provide some new insight into the mystery of the
arrow of time. I would also suggest that similar methods
might be applied to explain other apparently fine-tuned
features of quantum physics. For example, one might
hope to derive the principle of information causality and
thus obtain the Tsirelson bound [24].
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